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 Foreign Exchange Earnings and Price Stabilization Schemes
 Whether price and output stabilization schemes for primary commodities
 are likely to increase or decrease foreign exchange earnings from what they
 would be otherwise is a question of great importance to the countries con-
 templating the formation of such institutional arrangements. This paper
 sheds some light on this question and clarifies under what circumstances
 Ragnar Nurkse's assertion' is valid that countries will fail to maximize
 foreign exchange earnings if they do stabilize prices.
 The analysis abstracts from other benefits that underdeveloped countries
 can allegedly be expected to derive from a stabilization of world primary
 commodity prices, such as, for instance, increased long-run demand for
 these products from the industrial countries, on the grounds that stable
 prices would remove one of the incentives for finding substitute and
 synthetic materials. This conclusion follows from the idea that manu-
 facturers often prefer a raw material with a stable price over a raw material
 with similar physical qualities that has a highly fluctuating price, even if
 that price may turn out to be somewhat lower over the long run.
 On the supply side and benefiting underdeveloped countries more directly,
 stable product prices and demand make it possible to plan agricultural,
 mining, and industrial outputs so that average cost per unit of output would
 be at a technical minimum. Another benefit of stable prices of primnary
 products may be more stable foreign exchange earnings which in turn would
 facilitate long-run development planning and the importation of capital
 goods. (See [5, pp. 139-276].)
 However, if Nurkse's suggestion is correct and price stabilization schemes
 would tend to reduce over-all foreign exchange earnings, this effect could
 outweigh all of the other potential benefits and would thus make altogether
 undesirable the institution of sucb schemes.
 I. The Model
 For purposes of exposition the following assumptions are made: The
 material is produced only in underdeveloped countries and requires no
 input costing foreign exchange. Production is responsive to domestic price
 as indicated by the supply curve shown in Figure 1, which does not shift
 throughout the length of the business cycle. The specific shape or position
 of the supply curve is of no importance at this point of the analysis as
 long as it has neither a zero nor a negative slope. The business cycle in the
 industrialized countries consists of two periods of equal length, a depression
 period during which the demand curve looks like D,D, and a boom period
 with a demand curve D2D2, parallel above D1Di. Domestic frictional costs
 1 "Stabilizing the prices received by producers interferes with the incentive to produce more
 when export prices are high, and serves perversely to keep up production for export when ex-
 port prices are low. This is obviously not a pattern that maximizes the producing country's
 export proceeds over the business cycle" [2, p. 1491.
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 of adjusting output from period to period, i.e., external diseconomies not
 reflected in the supply curve itself, are zero. It is clear that these assump-
 tions imply that variations in demand are responsible for existing price
 fluctuations.2 It is also implied that futures markets and storage of the
 product are insufficient to offset these cyclical variations in demand. What-
 ever the size of these equilibrating forces, their influence is assumed to be
 reflected in the shape of the supply curve or demand curve.3
 In the framework of this model total foreign exchange earnings without
 stabilization schemes over the full cycle are equal to (OA OK) + (OC- OM).
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 FIGURE 1
 The basic question of this paper can now be reformulated to the following:
 Does the introduction of a stabilization scheme increase or decrease the
 full-cycle export earnings equivalent to (QA .0K) +(OC. OM)? As is in-
 tuitively obvious, the answer to this question depends on what type of
 stabilization scheme is chosen and what the elasticities of the demand and
 supply functions are. In the following the buffer-stock and buffer-fund
 schemes will be examined and a brief reference to two other types of funds
 will be made.
 II. Bu.fer Stocks
 Under this scheme the stabilization board acts essentially as a storage
 agent. It is assumed to make no profits, to accumulate stocks during depres-
 2 An analysis of export proceeds of primary producing countries during 1901-51 made by
 the United Nations [4] shows frequent parallel movements of export prices and export quan-
 tities. This reflects the dominant influence of demand conditions. J. D. Coppock also found
 substantial correlation between export quantity and proceeds [1, p. 1431.
 3Since this paper was written, an article has been published which uses much the same
 basic model but explores the implications which variable home demand and backward sloping
 supply curves have on foreign exchange earnings when prices are allowed to fluctuate and
 when a buffer-fund scheme is employed [3].
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 sion, and to decumulate them during booms. It sets an equal price for both
 users and suppliers and maintains it from period to period. These condi-
 tions mean that the sum of the quantities demanded during boom and
 depression must be equal to output at that price over the entire time inter-
 val. The demand schedule D*D* in Figure 1 shows the average quantity
 demanded at each price per half of the cycle. The condition that demand
 should equal supply over the entire cycle is met at a price OL. At this price
 output in the first period is OB, of which OE is sold and EB is stored.
 Second-period demand at price OL is OF, which exceeds production OB by
 the amount BF. Since BF is equal to EB, the amount stored in the first
 period is just equal to meet the excess demanded in the second and the net
 accumulation of stock over the cycle is zero.
 Total foreign revenue at the price OL is equal to 2(OL. OB) and the rele-
 vant comparison is whether this quantity is equal to, smaller, or greater
 than (OA OK) + (OC. OM). The general mathematical formulation of these
 conditions is complicated even under the assumption of linear schedules,
 and depends on the elasticities of the functions.
 By the use of the diagram, however, it is possible to show the properties
 of a special case from which some interesting generalizations can be made.
 Assume that the boom and depression demand curves in Figure 1 shift
 parallelly. Now it is true that during one period the increase in revenue
 from the buffer-stock scheme is equal to the area (OB - OL) - (OA . OK),
 i.e., the two strips making up the area ABKL. Analogously the loss in
 revenue during the second period is represented by the area BCLM. But
 it is true that ABKL is smaller than BCLM because, on the basis of the
 assumptions and the shape of the schedules, AB=BC and KL=LM, so
 that thewidths of the strips are equal but, as the diagram shows clearly,
 their lengths and heights differ. Thus under the given assumptions the
 increase of revenue in one period fails to compensate for the decrease during
 the second period so that the buffer stock always reduces foreign exchange
 earnings below what they would be if the unrestricted market were allowed
 to function.4
 4The following algebraic proof of this theorem is due to A. C. Harberger.
 (1) q = a, + bp demand schedule during depressions
 (2) q = a2 + bp demand schedule during boom
 (3) q = e + fp supply schedule
 (4a) e +jp1 = a, + bpi PI= a1-e f-b
 (4b) e + fP2 = a2+ bp2 p a2-e
 a, + a2
 a, + a2 2 -
 (4c) e +fp - + bp p = (4c) ~~ ~~~~~2 f- b
 But
 a, + a2
 PI+P2 a(-e? 2- ) /2 - e
 + ~~~ 2 -b
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 This conclusion confirms the validity of Nurkse's proposition for the
 case of a parallel shift in the demand curve [2, p. 249]. Nurkse in his paper,
 however, concentrated on the supply side of the problem and failed to
 investigate what happens when the assumption of a parallel shift in demand
 is abandolled. The alternative boom demand schedule D2'D2' drawn in the
 diagram shows that the amount by which revenue changes as a result of
 the introduction of a buffer-stock scheme depends on the slope of the demand
 schedules. Thus by the way in which D2'D2' has been drawn, the buffer-
 stock revenue would be unchanged because the new D2'D2'curve (not shown)
 coincides with the old one at the critical price OL. But under the unre-
 stricted market system boom-period revenue would be (OD -ON), which is
 greater than (OC- OM), while the depression revenue remained unchanged
 at (OA OK). By analogous reasoning it follows that flatter D2'D2' schedules
 will reduce boom-period revenue from what it is under the parallel-shift
 case. In fact, a sufficiently elastic D2'D2' curve can lead to an excess of buffer-
 stock revenues over unrestricted market revenues.
 Using the technique just developed and starting again from the case of
 parallel schedules, it is easy to see that changes in the slope of the depression
 demand curve have effects opposite from those experienced by changes in
 the same direction of the slope of the boom demand curve. More inelastic
 (elastic) depression schedules yield smaller (larger) depression revenues
 without altering boom or buffer-stock revenues if the D1D1 curve is rotated
 around the price OL.
 How do different supply schedules influence the conclusions reached so
 far? The method used to show that the introduction of a buffer-stock
 scheme will always reduce foreign exchange earnings in the case of parallel
 shifts in the demand curves is valid for any positive slope of the supply
 curve. However, the exact size of the reduction is dependent upon the slope.
 Perfectly horizontal and vertical supply curves are the limiting cases where
 the introduction of the buffer-stock scheme will cause no changes in foreign
 exchange revenues. For the sake of completeness it is worth mentioning
 also that a negatively sloped supply curve, given parallel shifts in the de-
 mand curves, causes buffer-stock revenues always to be greater than un-
 Therefore,
 (6) 'P1+ P _ p, from which it follows that
 2
 (7a) Pi = P + AP
 (7b) P2 = p-AP.
 Revenue during each period is equal to q times the equilibrium prices, i.e., period-one receipts
 [e+f(p?Ap)I(p?Ap), etc., so that the formulation of the revenue question becomes:
 (8) [e + f(p + Ap)](p + Ap) + [e + f(p - Ap)](p - Ap) < 2(e + fp)(p)
 which reduces to
 (9) 2fAp2 < 0.
 Ap2 will always be positive. When f is also positive (i.e., the supply curve slopes upward and
 to the right), the left side will be larger than the right, which means that buffer-stock revenue
 will always be smaller than unrestricted market revenue. For the case of negative values of f
 (i.e., a backward-sloping supply curve) the conclusion is reversed.
 382 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
 restricted-market revenues. (For proof see the algebraic treatment in the
 last footnote.)
 From a purely logical point of view the conclusion from this model is that
 the introduction of a buffer-stock scheme may or may not increase foreign
 exchange earnings from what they are under an unrestricted-market sys-
 tem. While this in itself is a valuable insight, the analysis would be more
 useful if it were possible to establish whether in the real world boom or
 depression demand schedules are typically more elastic. Unfortunately, no
 empirical investigations of this question seem to have been undertaken.
 From a statistical point of view it is probably possible but difficult because
 of the paucity of data to distinguish between shifts in demand curves and
 changes in their slopes. On the theoretical level, however, one reason comes
 to mind why it is likely that boom schedules are less elastic than depression
 schedules.
 Many of the commodities for which price stabilization schemes are con-
 sidered serve as factor inputs for firms in industrial countries, and demand
 for them is derived from the demand for the manufacturing firms' products.
 When during a period of high demand for this output the price of the factor
 input rises, firms are usually reluctant to substitute another one because
 such substitutions typically require changes in production processes which
 are often accompanied by technical uncertainties and temporary reductions
 in output. XVhile it is likely that there is always some critical difference in
 the prices of competing inputs at which the switch is undertaken in spite
 of these difficulties, the point is here that the critical difference is greater
 during periods when demand for the firms' output is high than when it is
 depressed. Such a reluctance to switch to a substitute expresses itself
 statistically in a more inelastic demand curve for factor inputs during boom
 and leads to the conclusion that under the assumption of a positively sloped
 supply curve the introduction of buffer-stock schemes will reduce foreign
 exchange earnings from their free-market level.
 III. Buffer Funds
 The basic analytical model developed above can be used to examine the
 influence of a second type of stabilization scheme. Instead of storing the
 product and setting a uniform price for both users and suppliers, the agency
 under this scheme sets a stable price only for the producers and lets
 the market in each period find a price which equilibrates quantity sup-
 plied with the quantity demand. If the stabilization agency is required
 to make no profit and pay out as much to producers as it receives from
 buyers over the entire cycle, then the price paid to the producers and
 the quantity supplied by them are uniquely determined. To see how such a
 scheme would work, consider Figure 2. The basic assumptions are the
 same as those underlying the first graph. DID, and D2D2 are depression and
 boom demand schedules, SS is the supply curve. The locus of points an
 equal vertical distance from the two demand curves is shown as D*D*.
 Where this schedule intersects the supply curve, the conditions are met
 that the agency's excess revenue during boom is exactly offset by the
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 deficient revenue during depression, and the total earnings over the cycle
 are equal to the value paid to producers. At price OL quantity OB will be
 produced in each period. The price to users will be established at OJ during
 the depression period and OQ during the boom period, yielding a revenue
 over the entire cycle of (OB. OJ) + (OB- OQ) = 2(OB -OL).
 The problem of what happens to total foreign exchange earnings as a
 result of the introduction of the price stabilization scheme in terms of this
 diagram comes down to the question of comparing the areas of three rec-
 tangles. Is (0A-0K)+(OC-0M),<2(0B OL)? For the case of parallel
 demand curves the conclusions arrived at for the buffer-stock scheme are
 equally applicable to this scheme because the geometric properties of the
 p
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 functions again are such that the relevrant comparison is of the strips ABKL
 and BCLM. Thus the introduction of a bufFer fund will always reduce
 foreign exchange earnings. However, different slopes of the boom demand
 schedule will have opposite effects from those encountered under the
 buffer-stock scheme. As can be seen from D2'D2' in Figure 2, a boom schedule
 less elastic than a depression schedule reduces the excess of free-market
 revenue from what it was under the parallel-shift case. In general the
 steeper the boom demand curve, the greater the likelihood that the buffer-
 fund scheme will increase foreign exchange earnings above their free-
 market level.
 The influence which different combinations of the two demand and the
 supply schedules have on total revenue can be discovered by reasoning in
 the same way as for the buffer-stock scheme. This analysis is not presented
 here. The conclusion from such an exercise is again that as a matter of logic
 384 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
 alone the introduction of buffer-fund schemes can either raise or lower
 foreign exchange earnings. If, however, it is assumed that the boom schedule
 is less elastic than the depression schedule and that the supply curve is
 positively sloped, then it follows that buffer-fund schemes are likely to
 lead to higher and not, as in the case with the buffer-stock scheme, to lower
 foreign exchange earnings.
 IV. Other Marketing Schemes
 Space limitations make it impossible to explore in detail the application
 of the basic model to schemes under which the authority is not expected to
 break even but where instead it seeks to pursue other objectives such as
 the maximization of foreign exchange earnings or the optimum exploration
 of its monopoly position. Suffice it to indicate briefly that the first maximiza-
 tion principle requires setting price and output at the points of unitary
 elasticity on the two demand curves. While such a scheme guarantees
 maximum foreign exchange earnings, the supply-curve elasticity deter-
 mines whether the quantities sold can be obtained from domestic producers
 at an average price greater or smaller than that at which it is sold in the
 outside world. Thus it depends on the supply elasticity whether the
 scheme can be used as a taxation device or whether it requires a subsidy.
 The second objective leads to a choice of output and prices on the basis of
 the marginal-cost-equals-marginal-revenue principle. The agency's behav-
 ior under the scheme parallels that of a monopolist discriminating in two
 markets. While this scheme will always improve the terms of trade for the
 sellers of the product, total foreign exchange earnings may increase or de-
 crease, and simple generalizations about necessary conditions for a specific
 outcome cannot be made.
 V. Conclusions
 The model just presented could be modified to take account of such real
 world phenomena as typically longer recovery than depression periods of
 business cycles, storage costs, shifts in demand curves in response to
 monopoly pricing, etc. It is not likely, however, that the most general con-
 clusion that can be drawn from this analysis would be changed. This con-
 clusion is that the introduction of world primary commodity stabilization
 schemes does not necessarily increase total foreign exchange earnings ac-
 cruing to the producing countries.
 By introducing assumptions that are in addition to those underlying the
 basic model itself, it is possible to draw more specific conclusions. If demand
 is typically less elastic during periods of high demand than it is during
 periods of depression, buffer-stock schemes are likely to decrease foreign
 exchange earnings below what they would have been in the absence of such
 schemes because stable prices over the cycle forego the opportunity to ex-
 ploit the inelasticity of demand during boom periods. Under these circum-
 stances buffer-stock schemes therefore lead to a conflict between the sta-
 bilization and earnings-maximization objectives pursued by government
 agencies.
 Given the same demand conditions, however, buffer-fund schemes do
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 not present such a conflict between objectives because they allow foreign
 prices to fluctuate and exploit the inelasticity of boom demand schedules.
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 Fluctuations in Economic Activity: Planned
 and Free-Market Economies, 1950-60
 Three of the many claims to superiority made for planned economies over
 free-market economies stand out clearly: first, that they grow faster; second,
 that they provide full employment; and, third, that they are not subject to
 fluctuations in outputs [12, pp. 95-1021 [23, pp. 19-351. The first claim has
 been discussed at some length in Western literature. Independent indexes of
 growth for the planned economies have been developed by Western scholars,
 and the results have been analyzed and compared with similar indexes for the
 free-market economies [1 ] [ 11 ]. Considerably less attention has been paid to
 the second claim, possibly because measuring the degree to which the two sys-
 tems utilize available inputs is an even more complex problem than the
 calculation of growth indexes.1 Little attention has been devoted to the
 third claim2 that "Socialism is characterized, above all, by the absence of
 cyclical disturbances in production" [14, p. 9]; no statistical comparisons of
 fluctuations in economic activity in the two systems are available.
 The purpose of this paper is to compare the year-to-year fluctuations in
 output for a group of planned and a group of free-market economies. The
 first section describes the scope of the project and the data used, the second
 presents the results, and the third comments on the findings.
 'The possibility of underutilization of inputs in planned economies has been pointed
 out, among others, by Joseph Berliner [2, pp. 358, 363-66], Emily Brown [3, pp. 181-
 82], Robert Campbell [4], Naum Jasny [91, Alec Nove [15, p. 579], Alfred Oxenfeldt
 [21], and Lazar Volin [35, p. 306].
 2Fluctuations in the Soviet Union are discussed by Naum Jasny [10, pp. 11-13], G.
 W. Nutter [18, pp. 204, 221], and Eugene Zaleski [36, pp. 264-83].
